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Before CELEBREZZE, PECK and McCREE, Circuit Judges.
CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge.
For the third time in five years we are called upon to resolve a dispute between
environmentalists and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) over the legality of
the Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project. The issue on appeal in this instance is the
propriety of the district court's denial of Appellants' request for a permanent
injunction to prevent TVA from imminently closing the Tellico Dam. Appellants
allege that the resulting reservoir will flood the only recognized habitat of the snail
darter, a rare protected species of river-dwelling fish, *1067 thereby jeopardizing
its continued survival, in violation of §§ 7 and 9 of the Endangered Species Act of
1973.[1] 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
Tellico was initially proposed by TVA and ultimately approved by Congress in
October, 1966, as a multipurpose, water resource and regional economic
development project. It was primarily intended to benefit Blount, Loudon and
Monroe Counties, Tennessee, "an area characterized by underutilization of human
resources and outmigration of young people." Hearings before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 261.
The engineering focus of the proposal was a concrete and earthfill dam to be
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situated near the mouth of the Little Tennessee River. This impoundment would
create a navigable reservoir thirty-three miles long covering an area of 16,000
acres, including 2,100 acres of the existing river bed. Proponents of the project
claimed that it would stimulate new shoreline industrial development, increase
recreational opportunities and tourism, and augment existing hydro-electric
power generating and flood control capabilities.[2] Congress agreed and in 1966
authorized initial Tellico project appropriations. Construction commenced in
March, 1967. Closure of the dam is now scheduled to be completed in January,
1977.
For the present, the river remains free-flowing and Appellants seek to preserve it
indefinitely in its present state as a natural resource.[3] TVA counters that it is the
express will of the Congress that Tellico "be completed as promptly as possible in
the public interest." S.Rep.No.94-960, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1976). TVA
believes that such an unequivocal expression of congressional intent neutralizes
any violation of the Endangered Species Act which may be involved in the
impoundment of the river. We are therefore asked to balance the survival of a
living species against the completion of a public works project which is more than
80% completed and represents a federal investment of almost ninety million
dollars.
In 1971 and again in 1973, environmentalists and affected landowners petitioned
the federal court seeking to forestall construction of the Tellico Dam on the
ground that TVA had failed to comply with requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. They were
successful in obtaining a preliminary injunction which halted project
implementation for more than a year and a half,[4] affirmed by this Court in
Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th
Cir. 1972), but the district court ultimately concluded that TVA's revised Tellico
environmental impact statement fully complied with NEPA,[5] and we affirmed.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 492 F.2d 466 (6th
Cir. 1974).
In August, 1973, a University of Tennessee ichthyologist discovered a unique and
theretofore unknown species of fish, the snail darter (Percina Imostoma tanasi),
thriving in the Little Tennessee River. This three-inch, tannish, bottom-dwelling
member of the perch family was found to feed upon fresh water snails (from
whence its name was derived). In addition to providing the snail darter with a
bountiful supply of its primary food, the river also maintained the oxygen levels
required to sustain the species through aerating action of its rapidly flowing
currents. The range *1068 of the snail darter's habitat encompassed seventeen
miles of the river's course scheduled to be subsumed within the Tellico Reservoir.
A search of other rivers of comparable ecology confirmed that the Little Tennessee
was virtually the exclusive preserve of the world's snail darter population (recently
estimated to number between 10,000 and 15,000 fish).[6]
On December 28, 1973, four months after the discovery of the snail darter,
Congress passed the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. One of the
Act's purposes was "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved . . ." 16
U.S.C. § 1531(b). Section 1533 of the Act empowered the Secretary of the Interior
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to compile and maintain separate official lists of threatened and endangered
species.[7] Section 1536 unequivocally commits all federal agencies to:
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of [the Act] by . .
. taking such action necessary to insure that actions authorized,
funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued
existence of such endangered species and threatened species or result
in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species which is
determined by the Secretary . . . to be critical. (emphasis added).
Section 1540(g)(1)(A) authorizes suits by private citizens seeking "to enjoin any
person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality
or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of [the Act] or
regulation issued under the authority thereof."
In January, 1975, several persons, including Appellants Hill and Plater, petitioned
the Secretary of the Interior to add the snail darter to the endangered species list.
Section 1533(c)(2). As part of the rule making procedure,[8] TVA was invited by
the Department to comment. On November 10, 1975, over TVA's objections, the
snail darter was designated as an endangered species primarily because of the
threat posed by the Tellico project to destroy the species and its only known
habitat.[9] 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(i) (1975); 40 Fed.Reg. 47505-47506 (1975). As
required by § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i), Appellants notified both the Department of the
Interior and TVA on October 20, 1975, that continued preparations to impound
the Little Tennessee River would violate § 1536.
On February 28, 1976, Appellants brought suit in United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee seeking to permanently enjoin completion of the
dam. In April, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, acting pursuant to rule
making authority originally granted to the Secretary of the Interior in § 1536,
designated river miles .5 to 17 as the "critical habitat" of the snail darter. 41
Fed.Reg. 13926-13928 (1976); see 50 C.F.R. § 17.81 (1976).[10] On April 29th and
30th a trial was held during which evidence was presented pertaining to whether
the scheduled inundation of the Little Tennessee would jeopardize the species'
continued survival. The Court also entertained argument on whether permanent
injunctive relief would be appropriate to enforce compliance with the Act if the
evidence made out a prima facie *1069 violation of §§ 1536 or 1538(a)(1)(B). In a
memorandum opinion and order dated May 25, 1976,[11] the court concluded:
. . . the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that closure of the
Tellico Dam in January 1977 and the consequent creation of the Tellico
Reservoir will result in the adverse modification, if not complete
destruction, of the snail darter's critical habitat.[12]
However, the Court denied Appellants' prayer for a permanent injunction and
dismissed the action based upon an analysis of the equities which it found to be
controlling.
Appellants claim that the Court's refusal to impose an injunction was legally
inconsistent with its finding of a blatant statutory violation. They contend that the
Court clearly abused its discretion in light of express congressional recognition, in
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§ 1540(g)(1)(A), of the appropriateness of injunctive relief to redress violations of
the Act or of rules promulgated thereunder. They find no support within the
language of the Act or its legislative history for exempting on-going projects from
compliance and therefore ask us to enforce the letter of the law by summarily
halting Tellico Dam construction. Appellants argue that only Congress and the
Secretary of the Interior have the power to relieve TVA of its obligations under the
Act through enabling legislation or remedial rule making respectively. Our abiding
interest in preserving the functional independence of the coordinate branches of
government, as ordained by the constitutional separation of their enumerated
powers, compels us to reverse the District Court and grant the relief requested.
Wilderness Society v. Morton, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 479 F.2d 842, 892-893
(1973).
Although this legal controversy may well enjoy a modicum of notoriety because it
appears to pit the survival of an obscure fish against completion of a $100 million
reservoir, "the principles of law controlling [the case] are neither complex nor
revolutionary." Wilderness Society, supra, at 891. Only three questions need be
addressed:
1) Does Tellico Dam completion violate the Endangered Species Act?
2) Assuming a violation, are there adequate grounds for exempting
Tellico from compliance?
3) If no exemption is justified, is injunction the proper remedy to
effectuate the purposes of the Act?
We are satisfied that TVA's continued preparations to dam the Little Tennessee
violate § 1536 of the Endangered Species Act. The District Court concluded from
the evidence at trial that "it is highly probable that closure of the Tellico Dam and
the consequent impoundment of the river behind it will jeopardize the continued
existence of the snail darter." TVA conceded that a significant portion of the
designated "critical habitat" of the snail darter would be altered by conversion of
the free-flowing river to a reservoir. The record supports Appellants' claim that
the intrinsic environmental differences between river and reservoir bottom will
inexorably destroy large numbers of snail darter eggs as well as inhibit the species'
spawning instinct. Therefore, the District Court properly determined that, because
so few specimens have been found outside the critical habitat area, "the known
population of snail darters will be significantly reduced if not completely
extirpated . . ." by the drastic physical transformations to be accomplished by
closure of the dam.
For reasons not obvious from the record, the District Court's opinion does not
explicitly conclude that its factual findings constitute a prima facie violation of §
1536.[13] *1070 We rectify this defect now by construing footnote 1 of the
memorandum opinion as conclusive evidence that this was the intent of the
Court.[14] In determining whether TVA's creation of the reservoir contravenes this
section, the District Court appears to have relied upon an administrative
definition of violative conduct by the Secretary of the Interior. Under this
standard, an action affecting a designated critical habitat is deemed to be an
offense if it,
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. . . might be expected to result in a reduction in the number or
distribution of [the] species of sufficient magnitude to place the species
in further jeopardy, or restrict the potential and reasonable expansion
or recovery of that species.
40 Fed.Reg. 17764-17765 (1975).
Although we are not compelled to follow agency constructions of a regulatory
measure, courts have traditionally shown "great deference to the interpretation
given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration." Udall
v. Tallman, 308 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1964). Section 1536
conveys a pivotal role to the Secretary of the Interior to achieve voluntary
compliance with the policy objectives of the Act by federal agencies and
departments whose programs may alter critical ecosystems. The Secretary is not
empowered to veto the final actions of such agencies, even when he is convinced,
after the requisite consultation has ensued, that they violate the Act, National
Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 1976); accord, Sierra
Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303 (8th Cir. 1976). However, his compliance
standards may properly influence final judicial review of such actions, particularly
as to technical matters committed by statute to his special expertise.
We find the Secretary's interpretation of § 1536 to be both reasonable and
consistent with our reading of the Act's legislative history.[15] In the absence of
conflicting judicial precedents, we see positive benefit to be gained by impressing
his criteria with a judicial imprimatur. This will expedite the adjudication of future
cases as well as assist the Secretary in achieving a uniform federal conservation
posture with minimal reliance upon the courts. Applying this test to the District
Court's findings of fact, we conclude that TVA's Tellico project operations violate §
1536.[16]
TVA concedes the existence of a predictable causal nexus between the
impoundment of the Little Tennessee and the ultimate depletion of the snail
darter population. This admission alone suffices to bring the affirmative action
requirement of § 1536 into play. On appeal, however, TVA argues that closure of
the Tellico Dam, as the last stage of a ten year project, falls outside the legitimate
purview of the Act if it is rationally construed. TVA cautions that it would lead to
absurd results if we were to include the terminal phases of ongoing projects
among the "actions" of departments and agencies to be scrutinized for compliance.
We find this familiar line of reasoning unpersuasive and believe that the District
Court erred in adopting it. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 468 F.2d at 1177.
To countenance so restrictive a construction of § 1536, in the absence of positive
reinforcement from the Act's legislative history, would, in our view, be inimical to
achieving its objectives. We choose instead *1071 to give the term "actions" its
plain meaning in the belief that this will best effectuate the will of the Congress.
The complexity of the ecological sciences suggests that the detrimental impact of a
project upon an endangered species may not always be clearly perceived before
construction is well underway. In effect, such was the case here. For Congress or
the Secretary of the Interior to be able to make meaningful decisions in
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furtherance of the purposes of the Act, the opportunity to choose must be
preserved. Once a living species has been eradicated, discretion losses its
significance. Where a project is ongoing and substantial resources have already
been expended, the conflict between national incentives to conserve living things
and the pragmatic momentum to complete the project on schedule is most
incisive. Therefore, were we to deem the extent of project completion relevant in
determining the coverage of the Act, we would effectively defeat responsible
review in those cases in which the alternatives are most sharply drawn and the
required analysis most complex. This expedient strategy would frustrate effective
enforcement of the Act and hinder efforts to prevent the wanton destruction of
vulnerable species.
Current project status cannot be translated into a workable standard of judicial
review. Whether a dam is 50% or 90% completed is irrelevant in calculating the
social and scientific costs attributable to the disappearance of a unique form of
life. Courts are ill-equipped to calculate how many dollars must be invested before
the value of a dam exceeds that of the endangered species. Our responsibility
under § 1540(g)(1)(A) is merely to preserve the status quo where endangered
species are threatened, thereby guaranteeing the legislative or executive branches
sufficient opportunity to grapple with the alternatives.
The importance of this role is admirably demonstrated by a hypothetical situation
postulated by the district court:
If Plaintiff's argument were taken to its logical extreme, the Act would
require a court to halt impoundment of water behind a fully completed
dam if an endangered species were discovered in the river on the day
before such impoundment was scheduled to take place.[17]
The district court dismissed this proposition out of hand as unreasonable and
inconsistent with the intent of Congress. We disagree. Conscientious enforcement
of the Act requires that it be taken to its logical extreme.
In National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.) cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 97 S.Ct. 489, 50 L.Ed.2d 587 (1976), for example, the welfare of
the Mississippi Sandhill Crane was threatened by future construction of a 5.7 mile
segment of Interstate Highway I-10 scheduled to traverse the Crane's designated
critical habitat. Only 40 Sandhill Cranes are known to exist. Based upon the
weight of the evidence, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of
injunctive relief and remanded the case with instructions that an injunction issue
halting activities which might "jeopardize the continued existence of the
Mississippi Sandhill Crane or destroy or modify critical habitat" in violation of §
1536. Id. at 375. The injunction is to remain in effect until the Secretary of the
Interior determines that modifications to the project will bring it into compliance
with the Act.
In assessing the potential adverse impact of the highway upon the Crane's habitat,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that indirect effects such as accompanying private
development were relevant factors. This broad reading of the protection afforded
by § 1536 is consonant with our view. If injunctive relief is appropriate where
extirpation of the species is not a predictable consequence of the violative activity,
as in the Sandhill Crane case, it is unquestionably mandated here where
eradication is a realistic possibility.
We reject as inapposite all but one of the NEPA cases cited by TVA in support of
its *1072 on-going project exemption theory. In Environmental Defense Fund v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, Judge McCree, speaking for this Court, held that,
even if it were conceded that Tellico was a unified construction effort, a single
"ball of wax" whose contours were known and approved by Congress prior to
NEPA's effective date, Tellico was not excused from full compliance with
environmental impact statement requirements for on-going activities. 468 F.2d at
1172. We find Judge McCree's expression of the congressional intent behind NEPA
to be an accurate reflection of the pervading spirit of the Endangered Species Act:
. . . Congress envisaged on-going agency attempts to minimize
environmental harm caused by the implementation of agency
programs. This could encompass not only constant reevaluations of
projects already begun to determine whether alterations can be made
in existing features or whether there are alternatives to proceeding
with projects as initially planned, but also the consideration of the
environmental impact of all proposed agency action. Id. at 1176
(emphasis added).
All of the other NEPA cases which waive compliance based upon advanced project
construction, see e. g., Ragland v. Mueller, 460 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir. 1972);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States
Army, 470 F.2d 289, 301 (8th Cir. 1972), are readily distinguished by one fact
which they all share: any judicial error in a NEPA case is subject to later review
and remedial reversal before permanent damage is done to the environment. The
same cannot be said for an erroneously granted exemption from the Endangered
Species Act. If we were to err on the side of permissiveness here, and allow TVA to
complete and close the dam as scheduled, the most eloquent argument would be
of little consequence to an extinct species.
We conclude that the on-going nature of a project does not preclude enforcement
of § 1536. National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, supra; Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1305 (8th Cir. 1976).[18] TVA has failed to take the
necessary steps to insure that the impoundment of the Little Tennessee River will
not jeopardize the survival of the snail darter or modify its habitat. We, therefore,
find that continued work, directed toward impoundment, violates § 1536 of the
Act. See National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, supra at 373.
We cannot condone non-compliance on the theory propounded by TVA that
congressional approval of Tellico appropriations, upon full disclosure of the plight
of the snail darter, constitutes legislative acquiescence in or express ratification of
TVA's laissez faire interpretation of the Act. See Hearings on Public Works for
Water and Power Development Appropriation Bill, 1977, before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 260-262 (1976).
Advisory opinions by Congress concerning the "proper" application of an existing
statute cannot influence our review because they lack the force of law. To credit
them would be tantamount to permitting the legislature to invade a province
reserved to the courts by Article III of the constitution. The meaning and spirit of
the Act are clear on its face. We need not refer to legislative history to rationalize
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our independent assessment of its impact. See e. g., United States v. Oregon, 366
U.S. 643, 648, 81 S.Ct. 1278, 6 L.Ed.2d 575 (1961); United States v. Jones, 542
F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976). As the District of Columbia Circuit has said in a similar
context:
[I]t is well settled that repeal by implication is disfavored, and the
doctrine applies with full vigor when, as here, the subsequent
legislation is an appropriations measure, and when the prior Act is to
continue in its general applicability, as *1073 construed by the courts,
but the claim is made that it is to be subject to a particularized
legislative exception. Committee For Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.
Seaborg, 149 U.S.App. D.C. 380, 463 F.2d 783, 785 (1971) (footnotes
omitted).
If the separation of powers doctrine is to retain its vitality, Congress must be free
to appropriate funds for public works projects with the expectation that resulting
executive action will pass judicial muster. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.,
v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 355 (8th Cir. 1972). Conversely, courts must defend
their prerogative to apply the law as they find it "to require the Executive to abide
by the limitations prescribed by the Legislature." Wilderness Society v. Morton,
supra at 892. Judge Skelly Wright, in commenting upon the imperative nature of
this division of labor, has observed that:
The scrupulous vindication of that principle of law, implicit in our form
of government . . . and its [basic] checks and balances, looms more
important in the abiding public interest than the embarkation on any
immediate or specific project, however desirable in and of itself, in
contravention of that principle. Id.
Congress recognized the danger of bypassing plenary consideration of proposed
modification to existing laws by adding amendments to appropriations bills. As
the Eighth Circuit notes in Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, House Rule
XXI is specific in providing that "no appropriation shall be reported in any
general appropriation bill, . . . Nor shall any provision in any such bill or
amendment thereto changing existing law be in order, . ." 473 F.2d 346, 354
(emphasis added).
TVA directs us to our own decision in United States ex rel. TVA v. Two Tracts of
Land, 456 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1972), as evidence of our reliance upon
congressional spending decisions as indicia of legislative approval of the
application of existing laws by the executive branch. This citation bespeaks a
misapprehension of the significance of that case. It also ignores the relevance of
our rejection in a more recent decision of TVA's argument that sustained
congressional appropriations excused Tellico from full compliance with NEPA.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d at 1182. In
Two Tracts we viewed the continued financing of TVA's on-going land acquisition
activities as implied ratification by Congress of a system of rules and regulations
promulgated by TVA to give effect to enabling legislation which the Authority was
charged with administering.[19] We found nothing in TVA's procedure which
conflicted with reasonable attainment of that legislation's fundamental goals.
Where a statute or executive order provides but the bare bones of a project
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authorization, leaving the administrative "flesh" to be added by an implementing
authority, courts may properly interpret sustained congressional appropriations as
some evidence that the evolving form of the project effectuates the original
legislative intent.
In the instant case, however, TVA is neither charged with administering the Act
nor is its conduct compatible with the measure's conservationist aims. In spite of
this, TVA asks us to bow to the will of Congress as it may be construed from
pronouncements of two congressional appropriations subcommittees.[20] As a
court we cannot countenance such patent usurpation of legislative authority. Nor
will we expurgate an important federal policy statute designed to foreclose all
activities antithetic to the preservation of the "esthetic, ecological, educational,
historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people" of
vulnerable species of fish, wildlife and plants. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3); see United
States v. Jones, supra at 673. We are fully in accord with the 4th Circuit's view, in
*1074 West Virginia Division of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz,
that:
Economic exigencies . . . do not grant courts a license to rewrite a
statute no matter how desirable the purpose or result might be . . .
[T]he appropriate forum to resolve this complex and controversial
issue is not the courts but the Congress. 522 F.2d 945, 955 (4th Cir.
1975).
With no cause to exempt the Tellico project from strict compliance with the Act,
we find that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to permanently
enjoin all further actions by TVA which may detrimentally alter the critical habitat
of the snail darter. We cannot accept TVA's contention that, even if Tellico
completion is technically in violation of the law, halting further construction
pending intervention by Congress or additional rule making by the Secretary of
the Interior constitutes an inequitable remedy.
TVA claims to have done everything possible to save the snail darter, short of
abandoning work on the dam. That alternative is deemed by TVA to be innately
unreasonable. We do not agree. It is conceivable that the welfare of an endangered
species may weigh more heavily upon the public conscience, as expressed by the
final will of Congress, than the writeoff of those millions of dollars already
expended for Tellico in excess of its present salvagable value.
We recognize that TVA has completed an experimental transplant of some 700
snail darter specimens from the Little Tennessee to the Hiwassee River which is of
similar physical character. While we share the hope that conclusive evidence, not
yet available, will confirm that the displaced population is thriving and
reproducing, even if that evidence were properly before us, it would not alter our
decision to enjoin further Tellico Dam construction. It is not the courts but the
Secretary of the Interior who bears the responsibility for maintaining the
endangered species list and designating the critical habitats of listed species. The
fact that both of these determinations are accomplished by rule-making rather
than by adjudication confirms the public importance of the issues at stake.
Nowhere in the Act are courts authorized to override the Secretary by arbitrarily
"reading" species out of the endangered list or by redefining the boundaries of
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existing critical habitats on a case-by-case basis. The standard of judicial review of
such rule-making, defined in Section 706 of the Administrative Procedures Act, as
interpreted in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414,
91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), is restrictive.[21] It does not permit
substitution of judgment. TVA will have to petition the Secretary if it wishes to
attempt to blunt the impact of the Act by curative rule-making. So long as the
snail darter remains on the endangered list and its critical habitat comprises miles
.5 through 17 of the Little Tennessee River, we have no recourse but to enjoin
creation of the reservoir.
Although we must reverse the district court's decision, we are sympathetic to its
analysis of the equitable factors present here which would normally militate
against granting injunctive relief. TVA has not acted in bad faith. Its efforts to
preserve the snail darter appear to be reasonable.
As we have already demonstrated, only Congress or the Secretary of the Interior
can properly exempt Tellico from compliance with the Act. The separation of
powers doctrine is too fundamental a thread in our constitutional fabric for us to
be tempted to preempt congressional action in the name of equity or expediency.
The district court abused its discretion when it refused to enjoin a clear violation
of federal law. As the Supreme Court has said in Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,
331, *1075 64 S.Ct. 587, 592, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944); where the national policy
objectives of a statute have been frustrated, ". . . the standards of the public
interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and
need for injunctive relief . . ." Accord, Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972).
Therefore, we reverse the district court's order of dismissal and remand the cause
with instructions that a permanent injunction issue halting all activities incident
to the Tellico Project which may destroy or modify the critical habitat of the snail
darter. This injunction shall remain in effect until Congress, by appropriate
legislation, exempts Tellico from compliance with the Act or the snail darter has
been deleted from the list of endangered species or its critical habitat materially
redefined.
Reversed and remanded.
McCREE, Circuit Judge (concurring).
I concur in the judgment of the court. The district court found that the completion
of the Tellico dam would "jeopardize the continued existence of the snail darter,"
and, therefore, we must conclude that completion of the project would violate the
Endangered Species Act. The Tellico dam project is not exempt from the
provisions of the Act, either because it was begun before the Act was passed and
before the snail darter was listed as an endangered species, or because a
Congressional committee was aware of the fact that the snail darter would be
threatened by completion of the dam when the Congress approved additional
appropriations. I agree that the case should be remanded with instructions to
issue an injunction forbidding project activity that would threaten the existence of
the snail darter.
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[1] 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536 and 1538(a)(1)(B) respectively.
[2] The Tellico Dam will have no electrical generators, but will contribute hydrostatic capacity to the
existing TVA system via an 850 foot canal connecting the Tellico Reservoir with the Fort Loudon
Reservoir.
[3] Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 339 F.Supp. 806, 809
(E.D.Tenn.1972), summarizes in considerable detail the scenic, historical, archeological and
recreational attributes of the Little Tennessee River in its pristine state.
[4] Id.
[5] Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 371 F.Supp. 1004 (E.D.Tenn.1973).
[6] TVA searched unsuccessfully for the species in 60 to 70 rivers in Alabama and Tennessee. Less
than 70 specimens have been sighted downstream from the location of the Tellico Dam itself and
none have been found above river mile 18 of the Little Tennessee.
[7] The snail darter is not one of the species over which the Secretary of Commerce has "program
responsibilities" pursuant to Reorganization Plan Number 4 of 1970. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2).
[8] 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) and the rule making provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
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